Contrary to Skepticism

Authors

  • Kathrin Hönig Zürich

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14766/323

Keywords:

Feminismus, Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Wissenschaftstheorie, Geschlecht, Gender

Abstract

Feminist scientific criticism has been suffering for some time under a problematic turn to cognitive theory; such is Sharyn Clough’s diagnosis. The criticism thereby falls short of its actual task: the critique of scientific praxis. In addition, the concentration on questions of cognitive theory makes global skepticism the order of the day, which disastrously affects the believability of feminist cognitive claims. This problem is to be tackled with an anti-representational approach.

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Published

2005-03-03

Issue

No. 15 (2005): Offenes Heft

Section

Offener Teil

License

Copyright (c) 2005 Kathrin Hönig

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